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Abstract
Workers who earn at or below the minimum wage in the United States are mostly either less
educated, young, or female. Little is known, however, concerning the extent to which the mini-
mum wage influences wage differentials among workers with different observed characteristics and
among workers with the same observed characteristics. This paper shows that changes in the real
value of the minimum wage over recent decades have affected the relationship of hourly wages with
education, experience, and gender. The results suggest that changes in the real value of the mini-
mum wage account in part for the patterns of changes in education, experience, and gender wage
differentials and mostly for the patterns of changes in within-group wage differentials.
KEYWORDS: Minimum wage; wage inequality; censoring; quantile regression.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C21, C23, J31, J38, K31.
∗We are grateful to Garry Barrett, Richard Blundell, Iván Fernández-Val, Hidehiko Ichimura, Kengo Kato, Edward
Lazear, David Neumark, Whitney Newey, Ryo Okui, Jesse Rothstein, Aloysius Siow, and conference and seminar par-
ticipants in Advances in Econometrics Conference, Asian and Australasian Society of Labour Economics Inaugural Con-
ference, Asian Conference on Applied Microeconomics, Econometric Society Asian Meeting, International Association
for Applied Econometrics Annual Conference, Kansai Labor Economics Workshop, Kyoto Summer Workshop on Applied
Economics, Mini-conference in Microeconometrics, Society of Labor Economists Annual Meeting, Trans Pacific Labor
Seminar, Seoul National University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and University of Sydney for com-
ments, questions, and discussions. Oka gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Australian Government through
the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects (project DP190101152). Yamada gratefully acknowledges finan-
cial support from the Kyoto University Foundation, the Murata Science Foundation, and JSPS KAKENHI grant number:
17H04782.
†Monash University. tatsushi.oka@monash.edu
‡Kyoto University. yamada@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
03
92
5v
2 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  1
9 J
ul 
20
19
1 Introduction
Expectations for the role of the minimum wage in addressing inequality have increased worldwide
with concerns over growing inequality in recent decades. The minimum wage has been introduced
and expanded in many countries to lift the wages of the lowest paid workers. It has been pointed out,
however, that the minimum wage can cause both intended and unintended consequences (Card and
Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2008). The intended consequences are the beneficial effects
on the distributions of wages and earnings (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996; Lee, 1999; Teulings,
2003; Autor, Manning, and Smith, 2016; Dube, 2018). The unintended consequences are the adverse
effects on employment, consumer prices, firm value and profitability, and firm entry and exits (Aaron-
son and French, 2007; Draca, Machin, and Reenen, 2011; Bell and Machin, 2018; Aaronson, French,
Sorkin, and To, 2018). Proponents of the policy have typically assumed the view that the intended
effects are substantial and the unintended effects are negligible. On the other hand, opponents have
raised concerns that the unintended effects are not negligible. Most studies have focused on proving or
disproving the existence of adverse effects of the minimum wage, and fewer studies have examined the
distributional impact of the minimum wage in recent years (Card and Krueger, 2017).
The proportion and characteristics of minimum wage workers serve as starting points for a discus-
sion on the distributional impact of the minimum wage. According to the Current Population Survey
(CPS), the proportion of workers who earn at or below the minimum wage in the United States ranges
between 3 and 9 percent for the years 1979 to 2012 (Figure 1a). Less than 10 percent of workers have
been directly affected by the minimum wage in the U.S. labor market. The extent to which the mini-
mum wage affects the wage structure depends on the magnitude of the spillover effects on workers who
earn more than the minimum wage. The minimum wage can exert a substantial influence on the wage
structure if there are strong spillover effects.
Perhaps a less well-known fact is that minimum wage workers are concentrated in particular demo-
graphic groups. Approximately 90 percent of workers who earned at or below the minimum wage in
the United States between the years 1979 and 2012 were high school graduates or less, younger than 25
years old, or female (Figure 1b). The reason was not that the minimum wage policy had been targeted
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based on education, experience, or gender, but because the lowest paid workers were mostly either less
educated, young, or female. In light of this, the minimum wage may affect the relationship of hourly
wages with education, experience, and gender.
Figure 1: Proportion and characteristics of minimum wage workers
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Notes: Figure 1a is reproduced from Figure 2 in Autor et al. (2016). In Figure 1b, less-educated workers are those with a
high school degree or less, and young workers are those aged 24 years or less.
Motivated by the fact above, we examine the distributional impact of the minimum wage in different
ways from previous studies. We first consider a standard wage equation, in which the logarithm of real
hourly wages is determined by education, experience and gender. We then look at changes in the
distribution of wages resulting from the minimum wage through the lens of the wage equation. We
allow the impact of the minimum wage to be heterogeneous with respect to unobserved, as well as
observed, characteristics of workers, and for this purpose we adopt a quantile regression approach.
Using quantile regression estimates, we evaluate the contribution of the minimum wage to changes in
between- and within-group inequality.
We show that changes in the real value of the minimum wage over recent decades have affected the
relationship of hourly wages with education, experience, and gender in the United States. The impact
of the minimum wage is heterogeneous across workers depending on their observed characteristics.
Consequently, changes in the real value of the minimum wage account in part for the patterns of changes
in education, experience, and gender wage differentials. We further show that changes in the real value
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of the minimum wage over recent decades have affected wage differentials among workers with the
same observed characteristics. The impact of the minimum wage is heterogeneous across quantiles
of workers’ productivity not attributable to their observed characteristics. Consequently, changes in
the real value of the minimum wage account mostly for the patterns of changes in within-group wage
differential among workers with lower levels of experience.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the data and institutional background. Section 4 presents an econometric framework
to evaluate the quantitative contribution of the minimum wage to changes in between- and within-group
inequality. Section 5 provides the empirical results. The final section concludes.
2 Related Literature
The literature has proven that the minimum wage has an effect on the distribution of hourly wages
in the United States, while the magnitude and mechanisms of the effect vary across studies (DiNardo
et al., 1996; Lee, 1999; Teulings, 2003; Autor et al., 2016). These studies develop and adopt different
approaches that take into account different degrees of heterogeneity and spillovers in the impact of the
minimum wage. DiNardo et al. (1996) develop a semiparametric approach to estimating discontinu-
ous changes in the wage distribution at the minimum wage.1 Lee (1999) develop a semiparametric
approach to estimating heterogeneous effects of the minimum wage across quantiles of the wage distri-
bution. Teulings (2003) develops a parametric approach to estimating the impact of the minimum wage
on the wage distribution. When comparing semiparametric approaches developed by DiNardo et al.
(1996) and Lee (1999), DiNardo et al.’s (1996) approach allows for heterogeneous effects with respect
to workers’ observed characteristics, while Lee’s (1999) approach does not. DiNardo et al.’s (1996)
approach, however, requires additional assumptions to estimate the impact of the minimum wage from
the cross-sectional distribution of wages. Consequently, DiNardo et al.’s (1996) approach does not
allow for spillover effects, while Lee’s (1999) approach does. The approaches also differ in robust-
ness to unobserved state and time effects. If there is sufficient variation in the minimum wage across
1See also Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Melly (2013) for related approaches.
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states over time, Lee’s (1999) approach can separately identify the impact of the minimum wage from
unobserved state and time effects. Autor et al. (2016) refine and apply Lee’s (1999) approach to data
covering a longer period, and develop a test for the presence of spillover effects under a distributional
assumption. However, no study has incorporated heterogeneous effects across workers with different
observed characteristics in Lee’s (1999) approach.
Understanding the sources of changes in between- and within-group inequality is key to understand-
ing the mechanisms of changes in wage inequality in the United States (Lemieux, 2006; Autor, Katz,
and Kearney, 2008). However, little is known concerning the extent to which changes in between- and
within-group wage differentials are attributed to changes in the real value of the minimum wage. In
the literature, changes in between-group wage differentials have been typically attributed to changes
in technology, workforce composition, and gender discrimination (see Katz and Autor, 1999; Blau
and Kahn, 2017, for surveys). There is no consensus on the quantitative contribution of the minimum
wage to changes in between-group wage differentials. DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lee (1999) conclude
that changes in the educational wage differential are attributable only to a small extent to changes in
the real value of the minimum wage, while Teulings (2003) concludes that changes in the educational
wage differential are attributable to a large extent to changes in the real value of the minimum wage.
DiNardo et al. (1996) demonstrate that the minimum wage was an important factor in accounting for
changes in wage inequality in the 1980s. However, the literature identifying the sources of changes in
within-group wage differentials have been less conclusive than the literature identifying the sources of
changes in between-group wage differentials (Lemieux, 2006; Autor et al., 2008).
3 Data
The data used in our analysis are repeated cross-sectional data from the Current Population Survey
Merged Outgoing Rotation Group. We construct variables in the same way as in Autor et al. (2016),
and focus on the period between 1979 and 2012 to ensure the comparability of results. We restrict
the sample to workers aged between 18 and 64 including males and females, full-time and part-time
workers, but excluding self-employed workers, in the same way as in Autor et al. (2016). We, however,
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add in the sample individuals for whom we cannot observe wages. The yearly sample size ranges from
142,000 to 235,000. Following DiNardo et al. (1996), Lee (1999), and Autor et al. (2016), we weight
each individual according to the sampling weight multiplied by hours worked.
Figure 2: The statutory minimum wage, 1979–2012
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Notes: Panel (a) includes Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Panel (b) includes Arkansas,
Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. Panel (c) includes Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington.
Minimum wage laws differ across states and change over time in the United States. The federal
government sets the federal minimum wage that applies to all states. State governments can set the
state minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage. The statutory minimum wage is the
maximum of the federal minimum wage and the state minimum wage.
Figure 2 shows the trend in the statutory minimum wage. For ease of reference, we divide all 50
6
states evenly into three groups according to the level of statutory minimum wage. During the period,
17 states had no state minimum wage (Figure 2a). The statutory minimum wage equals the federal
minimum wage in these states. The federal minimum wage increased four times: 1979 to 1981, 1989
to 1991, 1996 to 1998, and 2007 to 2010. The remaining 33 states set their state minimum wages
(Figures 2b and 2c). The statutory minimum wage has been higher than the federal minimum wage for
many years in these states. In the 1980s there was not much variation across states or changes over time
in the minimum wage. On the other hand, in the 1990s and the 2000s there was substantial variation in
the minimum wage across states over time.
Figure 3: The real value of the minimum wage, 1979–2012
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Notes: National averages are reported.
Figure 3 shows the national average trend in the real value of the minimum wage. The statutory
minimum wage is deflated by the personal consumer expenditure price index using 2012 as the base
year. During the period, there was a change in the trend in the year 1989. The real value of the
minimum wage fell due to inflation from 1979 to 1989. Subsequently, the real value of the minimum
wage exhibits an upward trend due to increases in the statutory minimum wage for the years 1989 to
2012.
4 Econometric Framework
In this section, we present our econometric framework. We start by introducing the (state-level) panel
quantile regression model. Then, we describe the censored quantile regression model. We end this
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section by describing our approach to evaluating the quantitative contribution of the minimum wage to
changes in between- and within-group inequality.
4.1 Model
The key feature of our model is that it allows the impact of the minimum wage to be heterogeneous with
respect to workers’ observed and unobserved characteristics. This feature is essential for evaluating the
contribution of the minimum wage to changes in between- and within-group inequality.
For the purpose of our analysis, we adopt the quantile regression approach pioneered by Koenker
and Bassett (1978) and developed by Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer (2016). We have a repeated
cross section of individuals i= 1, . . . ,Nst in states s= 1, . . . ,S, and time t = 1, . . . ,T . For each state and
year, the structure of wages can be expressed using the following quantile regression model:
Qst (τ|zist) = z′istαst (τ) for τ ∈ (0,1) , (1)
whereQst (τ|zist) is the τth conditional quantile of the log of real hourly wages, wist , given a J+1 vector
of observed individual characteristics, zist , for each state s and year t. The vector of parameters αst (τ)
can vary across quantiles τ . The vector zist includes a constant term, the linear and quadratic terms in
years of education and of potential experience (age minus education minus six), and an indicator for
being male. There are three reasons we use these variables. First, they are determined prior to the entry
of the labor market. Second, they are commonly used as regressors in the quantile regression of wages
(Buchinsky, 1994; Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-Val, 2006). Finally, and most importantly,
they are useful to distinguish minimum wage workers.2 The quantile regression model (1) is more
flexible than usual in that it allows all intercept and slope coefficients to vary across states and years.
Given the structure of wages described above, we examine the distributional impact of the minimum
wage by looking at changes in the vector of coefficients, αst (τ) ≡
(
α0st (τ) ,α1st (τ) , . . . ,αJst (τ)
)′, in
equation (1) resulting from changes in the real value of the minimum wage. We consider the following
2When we add an indicator of being white in individual characteristics, we find that the minimum wage has no effect
on the racial wage differential. The proportion of black workers was less than 20 percent among minimum wage workers
throughout the sample period. Even if the linear and quadratic terms in years of education and years of experience are
interacted with the indicator for being male, the results reported remain essentially unchanged.
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(state-level) panel data model:
α jst (τ) = mstβ j (τ)+ x′stγ j (τ)+ ε jst (τ) for j = 0, . . . ,J, (2)
where mst is the log of the real value of the minimum wage, and xst is a vector of state-year charac-
teristics. The vector xst includes state and year dummies and state-specific linear trends in the same
way as in Autor et al. (2016). A set of parameters, β (τ) =
(
β0 (τ) ,β1 (τ) , . . . ,βJ (τ)
)′, represents the
heterogeneous impact of the minimum wage. Note that the first element of the vector zist is one. The
second to last elements, β1 (τ) to βJ (τ), of the vector β (τ) measure the extent to which the impact of
the minimum wage varies across individuals according to their observed characteristics. If the impact
of the minimum wage is not heterogeneous with respect to observed characteristics, the parameter vec-
tor is β (τ) = (β0 (τ) ,0, . . . ,0)′ for a given τ . The quantile τ can be interpreted as the position in the
distribution of workers’ productivity not attributable to their observed characteristics. If the impact of
the minimum wage is not heterogeneous with respect to unobserved quantiles, the parameter vector is
β (τ) = (β0,β1, . . . ,βJ)′ for all τ .
Following Chetverikov et al. (2016), equations (1) and (2) can be estimated in two steps. In
the first step, we perform separate quantile regressions of wist by state s and year t for each quan-
tile τ using the individual-level cross-sectional data. We then obtain a set of estimated parameters
α̂st (τ) = (α̂0,st (τ) , α̂1,st (τ) , . . . , α̂J,st (τ))
′. In the second step, we perform the linear regression of
α̂ jst (τ) for each element j and quantile τ using the state-level panel data. Relative to several applica-
tions discussed in Chetverikov et al. (2016), we allow for interactions between the treatment variable
and individual characteristics,3 while we assume the exogeneity of the treatment variable. The mini-
mum wage is commonly assumed to be exogenous in the literature. We, however, examine the possi-
bility that differences in changes in the real value of the minimum wage across states may be driven by
differences in changes in unobserved state characteristics.
The approach described above is related to the approach used in Lee (1999), who estimates the
3Koenker (2017) recently notes that “somewhat neglected in the econometrics literature on treatment response and
program evaluation is the potentially important role of the interactions of covariates with treatment variables.”
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model of the form:
Qst (τ)−Qst (0.5) =
(
mst−Qst (0.5)
)
β (τ)+ x′stγ (τ)+ εst (τ) , (3)
where Qst (τ) is the τth unconditional quantile of wist . If the median wage, Qst (0.5), is absent, this
model corresponds to the case in which all individual characteristics are excluded from equation (1).
The main reason for the use of the median wage is presumably that there was insufficient variation in
the state minimum wage during the period of the author’s analysis, 1979 to 1988.
4.2 Estimation
We address the issues of censoring and truncation, building on the approach described above.
Censoring The wage distribution has been left-censored due to the minimum wage in many states
(DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999). This issue is evident from the data but typically ignored when
estimating the wage equation. The main reason, presumably, is that the magnitude of the bias due
to left-censoring at the minimum wage is negligible if the interest lies at the mean impact. However,
the magnitude of the bias may not be negligible if the interest lies at the distributional impact. The
left-censoring due to the minimum wage can cause the fitted wage equation to be flat. In this case, the
intercept coefficient becomes larger, while the slope coefficients become smaller. This effect is stronger
at quantiles closer to the minimum wage. As a likely consequence, the censoring effect (the impact of
the minimum wage at the minimum wage) may suffer from a downward bias, while the spillover effect
(the impact of the minimum wage above the minimum wage) may suffer from an upward bias.
In addition, the earnings data from the CPS is right-censored due to top-coding. This issue has
been widely recognized in the literature. Many studies using the CPS data make some adjustments for
top-coding. Hubbard (2011) develops a maximum likelihood approach to addressing this issue under a
distributional assumption, and shows that an increase in top-coded observations causes a serious bias in
the trend in the gender wage differential. The trends in the education and experience wage differentials
are also subject to the influence of top-coding.4
4For the τth quantile regression, this issue can be solved by winsorizing, only if the conditional probability of not being
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We adopt the censored quantile regression approach developed in Powell (1986), Chernozhukov and
Hong (2002), and Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Kowalski (2015) to address the issue of censor-
ing. This approach is semiparametric in the sense that it does not require a distributional assumption.
We consider the following censored quantile regression model to deal with left-censoring due to the
minimum wage and right-censoring due to top-coding.
Qst (τ|zist) =

mst if wist ≤ mst ,
z′istαst (τ) if mst < wist < cit
cit if wist ≥ cit ,
, (4)
where cit denotes the top-coded value.5 The key concept of this approach is to estimate the quantile
regression model using the subsample of individuals who are unlikely to be left- or right-censored.6
Appendix A.2 details the estimation procedure.
Missing wages There are diverse views on the employment effect of the minimum wage (Card and
Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2008). Given the importance of this issue, a valid question
may be whether changes in the wage distribution are due in part to a potential loss of employment
resulting from a rise in the minimum wage. For the sake of discussion, we suppose that workers lose
their jobs in the order of those with the lowest to highest productivity. In this case, percentile wages
can mechanically increase even without any actual increase in wages. This implies that if the sample
is restricted to employed individuals, the censoring effect and the spillover effect might be subject to
an upward bias. The magnitude of the bias depends on the magnitude of the employment effect. We
control for potential bias by imputing the wages of non-employed individuals.
Our approach builds on the quantile imputation approach developed in Yoon (2010) and Wei (2017).
censored given zist is higher than τ .
5The CPS sample is composed of hourly paid workers and monthly paid workers. Earnings for monthly paid workers are
top-coded, while wages for hourly paid workers are not. For monthly paid workers, earnings are divided by hours worked
to calculate hourly wages. Although the top-coded value of earnings is constant for a given year, the top-coded value of
wages differs according to hours worked. We, thus, allow the top-coded value to vary across individuals.
6In practice, it does not matter which values are assigned to the wages of workers who earn below the minimum wage
in the range less than or equal to the minimum wage. Similarly, it does not matter which values are assigned to the wages
of workers who earn above the top-coded value in the range greater than or equal to the top-coded value.
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For the purpose of imputation, we use the censored quantile regression model, instead of the standard
quantile regression, to take into account left- and right-censoring. In the process of imputation, we
assume that non-employed individuals are less productive than median employed individuals, as is
common in the literature on the gender wage differential (Johnson, Kitamura, and Neal, 2000).7 We
allow for selection on unobservables in that sense. Appendix A.2 details the imputation procedure.
Appendix A.3.1 provides the results without imputation.
Procedure The estimation procedure is divided into three stages. First, we estimate the censored
quantile regression model (4) using the sample of employed individuals and impute the wages of in-
dividuals for whom we cannot observe wages. Second, we estimate the censored quantile regression
model (4) using the sample of employed and non-employed individuals, and obtain the estimates for
intercept and slope coefficients α̂ jst (τ) in the wage equation for j = 0, 1, . . ., 5, s = 1, 2, . . ., 50,
t = 1979, 1980, . . ., 2012, and τ = 0.04, 0.05, . . ., 0.97. Both in the first and second stages, we perform
the separate regressions by state and year for each quantile. Finally, we estimate the linear regression
model (2) of α̂ jst (τ) using the state-level panel data.
Inference Chetverikov et al. (2016) derive the asymptotic properties of estimators for parameters in
equation (2). The authors show that estimation errors from the individual-level quantile regression are
asymptotically negligible, if the size of the sample used in the individual-level quantile regression is
sufficiently large relative to the size of the sample used in the state-level linear regression. Because the
sample size may not be sufficiently large in the least populous states, we choose to report bootstrapped
confidence intervals. We construct bootstrapped intervals from 500,000 bootstrap estimates obtained
by repeating the individual-level censored quantile regression 500 times and then repeating the state-
level linear regression 1,000 times for each quantile regression estimate. We allow for arbitrary forms
of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Specification checks As is common when estimating the impact of the minimum wage on the wage
distribution (DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999; Teulings, 2003; Autor et al., 2016), we focus primarily
7The results reported remain essentially unchanged if we assume that non-employed individuals are less productive than
30 or 70 percent of employed individuals.
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on the contemporaneous effect of the minimum wage. We estimate the following model in which we
add the lag and lead variables, ms,t−1 and ms,t+1, to assess the validity of the model specification.
α jst (τ) = ms,t−1β j,−1 (τ)+mstβ j,0 (τ)+ms,t+1β j,+1 (τ)+ x′stγ j (τ)+ ε jst (τ) for j = 0, . . . ,J. (5)
If model (2) is correctly specified, we expect two restrictions to be satisfied. First, the long-term
effect, β j,−1 (τ)+β j,0 (τ), in model (5), would be the same as the contemporaneous effect, β j (τ), in
model (2). This restriction will be valid if the policy effect is well captured by the contemporaneous
effect. Second, there would be no leading effect in model (5); that is, β j,+1 (τ) = 0. This restriction
will not hold if changes in the real value of the minimum wage are driven by changes in unobserved
state characteristics. We, thus, examine whether the long-term effect differs from the contemporaneous
effect, and whether the leading effect differs from zero.
4.3 Measures of inequality
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the quantitative contribution of the minimum wage to changes in
between- and within-group inequality. Here, we provide the definition of the two types of inequality,
and describe the way to measure the contribution of the minimum wage along the lines of the model
described above.
Between-group inequality is the wage differential among workers with different observed charac-
teristics. Consider two groups of workers, one of which consists of workers with individual characteris-
tics, zist = zA, and the other consists of workers with individual characteristics, zist = zB. Between-group
inequality can be defined as:
∆Bst (τ|zA,zB) := Qst (τ|zA)−Qst (τ|zB) (6)
for a given quantile τ (see Figure 4a for graphical description). Let ∆˜Bst denote the counterfactual
between-group wage differential if the real value of the minimum wage were kept constant at a certain
level. The contribution of the minimum wage can be measured by taking the difference between the
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Figure 4: Inequality measures
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Notes: The conditional quantile function Qst (τ|z) is an inverse of Fst (w|z), where Fst ( ·|z) is the conditional distribution
function of wist given zist = z in state s and year t.
actual wage differential and the counterfactual wage differential:
∆Bst (τ|zA,zB)− ∆˜Bst (τ|zA,zB) . (7)
Within-group inequality is the wage differential among workers with the same observed character-
istics. Consider a range between two quantiles, τA and τB, as a measure of inequality. Within-group
inequality can be defined as:
∆Wst (τA,τB|z) := Qst (τA|z)−Qst (τB|z) (8)
for a group of workers with individual characteristics, zist = z (see Figure 4b for graphical description).
Let ∆˜Wst denote the counterfactual within-group wage differential if the real value of the minimum wage
is kept constant at a certain level. The contribution of the minimum wage can be measured by taking
the difference between the actual wage differential and the counterfactual wage differential:
∆Wst (τA,τB|z)− ∆˜Wst (τA,τB|z) . (9)
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5 Results
Our results are divided into two parts. The first part is a collection of the results regarding the impact
of the minimum wage on the wage structure. The second part is a collection of the results regarding the
contribution of the minimum wage to changes in between- and within-group inequality.
5.1 Impact on the wage structure
We first present the results of estimating equation (2). Figure 5 shows the impact of the minimum wage
on the intercept and slope coefficients in the wage equation across quantiles. The four panels show the
estimates for β0 (τ), β1 (τ)+ 2β2 (τ)educ, β3 (τ)+ 2β4 (τ)exper, and β5 (τ), respectively, where the
bar represents the sample mean over all states and years. We summarize the impact of the minimum
wage on the coefficients of linear and quadratic terms in education and experience as the impact on
their marginal effects.
Both the intercept and slope coefficients in the wage equation are affected by the real value of
the minimum wage. The intercept coefficient increases with a rise in the minimum wage (Figure 5a),
while the slope coefficients of education, experience, and gender decrease with a rise in the minimum
wage (Figures 5b, 5c, and 5d). The former result implies that a rise in the minimum wage results in
a rise in the wages of the least-skilled workers in terms of observed characteristics. The latter result
implies that a rise in the minimum wage weakens the relationship of hourly wages with education,
experience, and gender. These results are consistent with the fact that less-educated, less-experienced,
and female workers are more directly affected by a rise in the minimum wage than more-educated,
more-experienced, and male workers. Furthermore, the magnitude of changes in the intercept and
slope coefficients varies across quantiles. In all cases, the impact of the minimum wage is greatest at
the lowest quantile and gradually declines in absolute value to zero by the 0.3 quantile. Spillover effects
are present but limited mostly to the first quintile.
Lag and lead Before discussing the contribution of the minimum wage to changes in between- and
within-group inequality, we present the results when estimating the augmented equation (5). The four
panels in Figure 6 show the estimates of the long-term effects. All estimates remain essentially un-
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Figure 5: Impact of the minimum wage on the wage structure
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Notes: Estimates of partial effects in equation (2) are reported. The shaded area represents the 95 percent confidence
interval. See Figure 17 for the uniform confidence band.
changed, although they become less precise. Indeed, the long-term effects fall inside the 95 percent
confidence intervals of the contemporary effects. The four panels in Figure 7 illustrate the estimates
of the leading (placebo) effects. All estimates are close to zero for virtually all quantiles, and none of
them are statistically significant. These results support our specification.
5.2 Contribution to changes in between- and within-group inequality
Finally, we discuss the quantitative contribution of the minimum wage to changes in between- and
within-group inequality. As in Figure 3, the real value of the minimum wage declined by 30 log points
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Figure 6: Long-term effect of the minimum wage on the wage structure
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Notes: Estimates of the long-term effects in equation (5) are reported. The shaded area represents the 95 percent confidence
interval. See Figure 18 for the uniform confidence band.
due to inflation for the years 1979 to 1989 and subsequently increased by 28 log points due to increases
in the statutory minimum wage for the years 1989 to 2012. Here, we provide the results for workers
with 10 years of experience or less, who are subject to the influence of the minimum wage, for the latter
period. Appendix A.3.2 shows the results for the former period.
5.2.1 Between-group inequality
Educational wage differential We measure the educational wage differential by comparing workers
with 16 years of education (equivalent to college graduates) and those with 12 years of education
(equivalent to high school graduates), holding experience and gender constant. The four panels in
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Figure 7: Placebo effect on the wage structure
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Notes: Estimates of the leading effects in equation (5) are reported. The shaded area represents the 95 percent confidence
interval. See Figure 19 for the uniform confidence band.
Figure 8 show the national means of changes in the educational wage differential due to increases in
the real value of the minimum wage for the years 1989 to 2012 by experience and gender for each
decile τ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9.
The minimum wage contributes to a reduction in the educational wage differential in the lower
quantiles. The contribution of the minimum wage to a reduction in the educational wage differential
is greater for more-experienced, female workers than less-experienced, male workers. For each group
of workers, the contribution of the minimum wage is greatest at the 0.05th quantile and gradually
declines in absolute value to zero by the 0.2th to 0.5th quantiles. For female workers with five years of
experience, however, it is slightly greater at the 0.1th quantile than the 0.05th quantile. The reason is
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Figure 8: Changes in the educational wage differential (16 versus 12 years of education) due to the
minimum wage, 1989–2012
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Notes: Estimates of log-point changes in the educational wage differential due to the minimum wage are obtained from
equation (7). The error bar represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
that, at the 0.05th quantile in this group, both more- and less-educated workers are affected by a rise in
the real value of the minimum wage.
The educational wage differential increased during the period (Figure 9). The trend in the edu-
cational wage differential is known to be important in accounting for the rise in wage inequality in
the United States (Autor et al., 2008). The increase in the educational wage differential is typically
attributed in the literature to skill-biased technological change and compositional changes in the work-
force (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor et al., 2008). The magnitude of the
increase in the educational wage differential is greater in the higher quantiles than the lower quantiles
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Figure 9: Actual and counterfactual changes in the educational wage differential (16 versus 12 years of
education), 1989–2012
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Notes: Actual and counterfactual log-point changes in the educational wage differential are obtained from equations (6) and
(7).
during the period, as also shown by Buchinsky (1994) and Angrist et al. (2006). The educational wage
differential did not increase at the 0.05 quantile and increased only moderately at the 0.1 quantile, while
it increased more in the higher quantiles. If there were no increase in the real value of the minimum
wage, however, the educational wage differential would increase at the 0.05 quantile and more than
double at the 0.1 quantile for all groups. Consequently, in the counterfactual case in which the real
value of the minimum wage is kept constant, the increase in the educational wage differential is more
uniform across quantiles. Our results indicate that the minimum wage is another factor in accounting
for the patterns of changes in the educational wage differential.
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Experience wage differential We measure the experience wage differential by comparing workers
with 25 years of experience and those with five years of experience, holding education and gender
constant. The four panels in Figure 10 show the national means of changes in the experience wage
differential due to increases in the real value of the minimum wage for the years 1989 to 2012 by
education and gender.
Figure 10: Changes in the experience wage differential (25 versus 5 years of experience) due to the
minimum wage, 1989–2012
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Notes: Estimates of log-point changes in the experience wage differential due to the minimum wage are obtained from
equation (7). The error bar represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
The minimum wage contributes to a reduction in the experience wage differential in the lower
quantiles. The contribution of the minimum wage to a reduction in the experience wage differential
is greater for less-educated, female workers than more-educated, male workers. For each group of
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workers, the contribution of the minimum wage is greatest at the 0.05th quantile and gradually declines
in absolute value to zero by the 0.2th to 0.5th quantiles. For female workers with 12 years of education,
however, it is slightly greater at the 0.1th quantile than the 0.05th quantile. The reason is that, at the
0.05th quantile in this group, both more- and less-experienced workers are affected by a rise in the real
value of the minimum wage.
Figure 11: Actual and counterfactual changes in the experience wage differential (25 versus 5 years of
experience), 1989–2012
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Notes: Actual and counterfactual log-point changes in the experience wage differential are obtained from equations (6) and
(7).
The experience wage differential increased during the period with the exception of the lowest quan-
tile (Figure 11). Changes in the experience wage differential are typically attributed in the literature
to compositional changes in the workforce (Welch, 1979; Jeong, Kim, and Manovskii, 2015). The
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magnitude of the increase in the experience wage differential is greater in the higher quantiles than the
lower quantiles during the period. The experience wage differential declined at the 0.05th quantile and
increased only moderately at the median, while it increased more at the 0.7th and higher quantiles. If
there were no increase in the real value of the minimum wage, however, the experience wage differen-
tial would increase in the lower as well as higher quantiles. Consequently, in the counterfactual case
in which the real value of the minimum wage is kept constant, the increase in the educational wage
differential at the 0.1th quantile is at least as high as the increase in the median for all groups. Our
results indicate that the minimum wage is another factor in accounting for the patterns of changes in
the experience wage differential.
Gender wage differential We measure the gender wage differential by comparing male workers and
female workers, holding education and experience constant. The four panels in Figure 12 show the
national means of changes in the gender wage differential due to increases in the real value of the
minimum wage for the years 1989 to 2012 by education and experience.
The minimum wage contributes to a reduction in the gender wage differential in the lower quantiles.
The contribution of the minimum wage to a reduction in the gender wage differential is greater for less-
educated, less-experienced workers than more-educated, more-experienced workers. For each group of
workers, the contribution of the minimum wage is greatest at the 0.05th quantile and gradually declines
in absolute value to zero by the 0.2th to 0.5th quantiles. For workers with 12 years of education and
5 years of experience, however, it is slightly greater at the 0.1th quantile than the 0.05th quantile. The
reason is that, at the 0.05th quantile in this group, both male and female workers are affected by a rise in
the real value of the minimum wage. For workers with 16 years of education, however, the contribution
of the minimum wage is only modest across quantiles.
The gender wage differential declined during the period (Figure 13). Changes in the gender wage
differential are typically attributed in the literature to changes in workforce composition and gender dis-
crimination (Blau and Kahn, 2017). Differently from the education and experience wage differentials,
the magnitude of the change in the gender wage differential is almost uniform across quantiles. If there
were no increase in the real value of the minimum wage, however, the gender wage differential would
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Figure 12: Changes in the gender wage differential (males versus females) due to the minimum wage,
1989–2012
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Notes: Estimates of log-point changes in the gender wage differential due to the minimum wage are obtained from equation
(7). The error bar represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
decline less in the lower quantiles. For workers with 12 years of education, the gender wage differen-
tial would not decline but could increase in the lower quantiles. Consequently, in the counterfactual
case in which the real value of the minimum wage is kept constant, the decline in the gender wage
differential is less in the lower quantiles than the higher quantiles for all groups. Our results indicate
that the minimum wage is another factor in accounting for the patterns of changes in the gender wage
differential.
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Figure 13: Actual and counterfactual changes in the gender wage differential (males versus females),
1989–2012
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Notes: Actual and counterfactual log-point changes in the gender wage differential are obtained from equations (6) and (7).
5.2.2 Within-group inequality
The four panels in Figure 14 show the national means of changes in the 90/10 and 50/10 within-group
wage differentials due to increases in the real value of the minimum wage for the years 1989 to 2012
by education, experience, and gender.
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Figure 14: Changes in the 90/10, 50/10, and 50/20 within-group differentials due to the minimum wage,
1989–2012
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Notes: Estimates of log-point changes in the within-group wage differentials due to the minimum wage are obtained from
equation (9). The error bar represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 15: Actual and counterfactual changes in the 90/10, 50/10, and 50/20 within-group differentials,
1989–2012
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Notes: Actual and counterfactual log-point changes in the within-group wage differentials are obtained from equations (8)
and (9).
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The minimum wage contributes to a reduction in the 90/10 and 50/10 within-group wage differen-
tials among workers with lower levels of education and experience. The contribution of the minimum
wage is the same for changes in the 90/10 and 50/10 within-group wage differentials except for female
workers with 12 years of education and no experience. The results reflect the fact that changes in the
real value of the minimum wage have no effect at the median or higher quantiles for almost all groups.
The minimum wage also contributes to a reduction in the 50/20 within-group wage differential, but
only moderately for fewer groups. The contribution of the minimum wage to changes in within-group
wage differentials is greater for less-educated, less-experienced, female workers than more-educated,
more-experienced, male workers. For workers with 16 years of education and five or more years of
experience, the contribution of the minimum wage is close to zero.
The 90/10, 50/10, and 50/20 within-group wage differentials declined during the period (Figure
15). The 50/10 wage differential declined more than the 50/20 wage differential. The magnitude of
the decline in within-group wage differentials is similar for male and female workers, but it is greater
for less-educated, less-experienced workers than more-educated, more-experienced workers. If there
were no increase in the minimum wage, however, the 50/10 and 50/20 wage differentials would change
almost equally. Furthermore, within-group wage differentials would decline similarly for less-educated,
less-experienced workers and more-educated, more-experienced workers, while they would decline less
for male workers and would not decline but could increase for female workers. Our results indicate that
the minimum wage accounts mostly for the patterns of changes in within-group wage differentials.
6 Conclusion
We have examined the impact of the minimum wage on the wage structure and evaluated the contribu-
tion of the minimum wage to changes in between- and within-group inequality in the United States. In
doing so, we have addressed the issues of heterogeneity, censoring, and missing wages by combining
three quantile regression approaches.
We have shown that changes in the real value of the minimum wage over recent decades have
affected the relationship of hourly wages with education, experience, and gender. In the literature,
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changes in between-group wage differentials are typically attributed to skill-biased technological change,
compositional changes in the workforce, and changes related to gender discrimination. Our results in-
dicate that changes in the real value of the minimum wage account in part for the patterns of changes
in the education, experience, and gender wage differentials. If there were no increase in the real value
of the minimum wage in the 1990s and 2000s, the education and experience wage differentials would
increase more uniformly across quantiles, while the gender wage differential would decline less uni-
formly across quantiles. Therefore, when we interpret the patterns of changes in between-group wage
differentials through the lens of economic models, there is a need to adjust the data taking into account
the influence of the minimum wage.
We have further shown that the impact of the minimum wage is heterogeneous across quantiles of
workers’ productivity not attributable to their observed characteristics. In the literature, the sources of
changes in within-group wage differentials are less conclusive than those of changes in between-group
wage differentials. Our results indicate that changes in the real value of the minimum wage account
mostly for the patterns of changes in within-group wage differentials for workers with 10 or less years
of experience. In particular, the decline in the 50/10 and 50/20 within-group wage differential among
female workers for the years 1989 to 2012 is attributed almost entirely to a rise in the real value of the
minimum wage.
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A Appendix
A.1 Conceptual framework
We provide a simple conceptual framework to understand the role of the minimum wage for the deter-
mination of the wage structure. Our model is related to and builds on the model in Bound and Johnson
(1992) and Katz and Autor (1999). The key idea of the model is that the actual wage can be decom-
posed into the competitive market wage and the wedge. The wedge, which can be referred to as the
rent, is a deviation of the actual wage from the competitive market wage.
The actual wage, Wist , for an individual i in state s and year t can be expressed as the product of the
competitive market wage, W ct , in year t and the rent, Rist , for an individual i in state s and year t.
Wist =W ct Rist
The log of the actual wage, wist , can be decomposed additively into the log of the competitive market
wage, wct , and the log of the rent, rist .
wist = wct + rist
In general, the rent is determined by state-specific institutional and non-competitive factors, mst and
xst , and individual-specific productivity factors, zist . Here, we consider the minimum wage to be a key
institutional factor and allow for its interactive effect with individual characteristics.
Rist = f (mst ,xst ,zist) = exp
[(
z′istβ
)
mst +
(
z′ist⊗ x′st
)
γ
]
Given this functional form, the log wage equation can be derived as:
wist = z′ist
[
mstβ +
(
IJ+1⊗ x′st
)
γ
]
,
where I is an identity matrix, and wct is subsumed into xst . The equation can be extended to allow for
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random coefficients.
wist = z′ist
[
mstβ (u)+
(
IJ+1⊗ x′st
)
γ (u)
]
,
where u represents unobserved individual characteristics, distributed uniformly from zero to one. This
random coefficients model is an alternative representation of equations (1) and (2).
A.2 Estimation and imputation procedures
We describe the procedures for the censored quantile regression estimation and the quantile imputation.
We implement the procedures for each state s= 1, . . . ,50, each year t = 1979,1980, . . . ,2012, and each
quantile τ = 0.04,0.05, . . . ,0.97. In this section, we suppress the subscripts s and t for notational
simplicity.
A.2.1 Censored quantile regression
The estimation proceeds in three steps (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2002). In the first and second steps,
we select the sample to be used for estimation. In the third step, we estimate the quantile regression
model using the selected sample.
Step 1. We estimate the probabilities of not being left- and right-censored for each individual. When
we partition the support of zi into Z 1, . . . ,Z H , we can nonparametrically estimate the probabilities of
not being left- and right-censored from the empirical probabilities: p̂L (zi) := ∑Hh=1 p̂Lh {zi ∈Z h} and
p̂R (zi) := ∑Hh=1 p̂Rh {zi ∈Z h}, respectively, where for each h
p̂Lh (zi) :=
∑Ni=11{wi > m,zi ∈Z h}
∑Ni=11{zi ∈Z h}
, and p̂Rh (zi) :=
∑Ni=11{wi > c,zi ∈Z h}
∑Ni=11{zi ∈Z h}
.
We partition the support of zi by years of education (0–12, 12+), years of experience (0–9, 10–19,
20–29, 30+), and gender. Using the empirical probabilities, we select the sample:
I1 :=
{
i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} : 1− p̂L (zi)+ηL < τ < p̂R (zi)−ηR
}
,
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where ηL and ηR are small positive constants to accommodate possible specification and estimation
errors. Following Chernozhukov and Hong (2002), we set ηL and ηR at the 0.1th quantiles of the
empirical probabilities of not being censored given 1− p̂L (zi)< τ and τ < p̂R (zi), respectively.
Step 2. We estimate the quantile regression model using the selected sample I1. Using a set of
estimated coefficients α˜ (τ), we select the sample:
I2 :=
{
i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} : m+ζ L < z′iα˜ (τ)< c−ζR
}
,
where ζ L and ζR are small positive constants. Following Chernozhukov et al. (2015), we set ηL and
ηR at the 0.03th quantiles of the positive fitted values of z′iα˜ (τ)−m and ci− z′iα˜ (τ), respectively.
Step 3. We estimate the quantile regression model using the selected sample I2.
A.2.2 Quantile imputation
The imputation proceeds in two steps (Wei, 2017).
Step 1. We estimate the censored quantile regression model (4) using a sample of individuals for
whom we can observe wages. We obtain a set of estimated coefficients {α̂ (τ) : τ ∈T ∗}, whereT ∗ :=
{0.04,0.05, . . . ,0.49}.
Step 2. We draw a random variable, u`i , from a uniform distribution over T ∗ independently 10 times
for individuals for whom we cannot their wages. For each realization of u`i , we predict their wages
using the quantile regression model:
ŵ`i := z
′
iα̂
(
u`i
)
.
If the predicted value is smaller than the minimum wage or greater than the top-coded value, it is
replaced with the minimum wage or the top-coded value. We impute their wages by taking the mean
of predicted values. We calculate their weights using hours worked imputed by fitting a fifth-order
polynomial regression on wages.
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A.3 Additional Results
Figure 16: Impact of the minimum wage on the wage structure without imputation
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Notes: Estimates of partial effects in equation (2) are reported. The shaded area represents the 95 percent confidence
interval.
A.3.1 Impact on the wage structure
Figure 16 shows the impact of the minimum wage on the intercept and slope coefficients in the wage
equation across quantiles, when we do not impute the wages of individuals for whom we cannot observe
wages. Both the intercept and slope coefficients in the wage equation are affected by the real value of
the minimum wage in the same way as we see in Figure 5.
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Figure 17: Impact of the minimum wage on the wage structure: confidence band
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Notes: Estimates of partial effects in equation (2) are reported. The shaded area represents the 90 percent uniform confidence
band.
Figures 17, 18, and 19 show uniform confidence bands of the estimates in Figures 5, 6, and 7,
respectively. We follow Chernozhukov et al. (2013) in obtaining uniform confidence bands. Naturally,
uniform confidence bands are wider than pointwise confidence intervals. However, we cannot reject
the hypothesis of no effect of the minimum wage.
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Figure 18: Long-term effect of the minimum wage on the wage structure: confidence band
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Notes: Estimates of the long-term effects in equation (5) are reported. The shaded area represents the 90 percent uniform
confidence band.
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Figure 19: Placebo effect on the wage structure: confidence band
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Notes: Estimates of the leading effects in equation (5) are reported. The shaded area represents the 90 percent uniform
confidence band.
A.3.2 Changes in between- and within-group wage differentials, 1979–1989
Figures 20 to 23 show actual and counterfactual changes in between- and within-group wage differen-
tials for the years 1979 to 1989.
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Figure 20: Changes in the educational wage differential (16 versus 12 years of education), 1979–1989
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(b) 10 years of experience, males
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(c) 5 years of experience, females
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During the 1979–1989 period, the educational wage differentials increased almost uniformly across
quantiles (Figures 20), as also shown by Buchinsky (1994) and Angrist et al. (2006). If there were no
decrease in the real value of the minimum wage, however, the educational wage differentials would
increase less uniformly across quantiles.
The experience wage differentials also increased roughly uniformly, although they increased slightly
more in the higher quantiles than the lower quantiles (Figures 21). If there were no decrease in the real
value of the minimum wage, however, the experience wage differentials would increase more differ-
ently across quantiles.
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Figure 21: Changes in the experience wage differential (25 versus 5 years of experience), 1979–1989
(a) 12 years of education, males
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(b) 16 years of education, males
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(c) 12 years of education, females
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(d) 16 years of education, females
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The gender wage differential declined more in the higher quantiles than the lower quantiles. If there
were no decrease in the real value of the minimum wage, however, the gender wage differential would
decline more uniformly across quantiles.
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Figure 22: Changes in the gender wage differential (males versus females), 1979–1989
(a) 12 years of education, 5 years of experience
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(c) 16 years of education, 5 years of experience
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The 90/10, 50/10, and 50/20 within-group wage differentials changed little for male workers and
increased for female workers. For female workers, the magnitude of the increase in within-group wage
differentials is similar for less-educated and more-educated workers but greater for more-experienced
than less-experienced workers. If there were no decrease in the real value of the minimum wage,
however, within-group wage differentials would increase much less especially for workers with 5 or
less years of experience.
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Figure 23: Changes in the 90/10, 50/10, and 50/20 within-group differentials, 1979–1989
(a) 90/10, males
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(c) 50/10, males
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(d) 50/10, females
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(e) 50/20, males
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